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1 octobre 2010
- handle: 10670/1.r9c7go
- hal: hal-01023800
- doi: 10.1177/0951629810371015
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepsg269m
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepsg269m
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Hervé Crès et al., « Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1177/0951629810371015
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Résumé
When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 -- 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d < n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d 'ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover, the equilibrium is the mean voter.