Fiche du document
20 décembre 2023
- handle: 10670/1.rffmd3
- hal: hal-04189991
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Sujets proches
Dutch auctions VenduesCiter ce document
Adrien Coiffard et al., « Conservation auctions: an online double constraint reverse auction experiment », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.rffmd3
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
Conservation auctions are reverse auctions designed to allocate payments for environmental services. We perform an online experiment to study a reverse auction that combines both a budget and a target constraint, i.e., a double constraint auction. We compare the performance of this auction format to target and budget constraint formats according to three different criteria: the number of units purchased, the budget spent and the unit cost. Our results show that the performance of the double constraint auction, compared with announcing only a target constraint or a budget constraint, depends on the buyer's objective(s). Indeed, our main conclusion is that no ranking satisfies our three criteria simultaneously.