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- handle: 10670/1.rqyp8s
- hal: hal-02621675
- doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.003
- PRODINRA: 405669
- WOS: 000444927300007
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.003
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Vertical relations Exclusive dealing Vertical merger Foreclosure Bilateral contracting L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L42 - Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionSujets proches
Industries--Vertical integration Integration, Vertical Industrial economics Market structure Statutory foreclosure Mechanics' lien foreclosure Strict foreclosure Mortgage foreclosure Foreclosure sales Foreclosure--Law and legislation Shoppers Customers (Consumers) Integration, VerticalCiter ce document
Volker Nocke et al., « Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.003
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Résumé
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream manufacturers that produce differentiated goods and downstream retailers that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, at the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.