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- handle: 10670/1.sjyqgv
- hal: hal-01158155
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Mots-clés
Lerner egalitarianism random redistribution incentives qualified constraints H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H21 - Efficiency • Optimal Taxation H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H26 - Tax Evasion and AvoidanceSujets proches
Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy Taxes Grants Subventions Vouchers (Subsidies) Corporate subsidies Welfare, Corporate Government subsidies Business subsidies Corporate welfare Government aid Federal aidCiter ce document
Stéphane Gauthier et al., « Redistribution by Means of Lotteries », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10670/1.sjyqgv
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Résumé
A government designs transfers to agents in the absence of information on their preferences. The second-best allocation is equal sharing among citizens when the awards are deterministic. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which lotteries improve upon the egalitarian outcome. The condition requires that the citizens with large social weights have low risk aversion, and that the left tail of the distribution of risk aversion be sufficiently dispersed.