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2015
- handle: 10670/1.slcwqj
- halshs: halshs-01147610
Mots-clés
Constitutions measurement politics power principal-agent C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorSujets proches
Choice, Social Public choice Collective choice Political thought Government Political theory Civil government Commonwealth, The Science, Political Administration PoliticsCiter ce document
Jean-Michel Josselin, « Public Choice Reflections on the Measurement of Political Power », HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société, ID : 10670/1.slcwqj
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Résumé
Social Choice and game theory provide a quantitative assessment of political power notably through power indexes applied to various institutional settings such as Parliaments. Public Choice does not go as far as formal measurement; it rather uses a model of constitutions, namely a principal-agent relationship to describe power delegations from citizens to government and from government to its own agents. Since constitutions are inherently incomplete contracts, the extent of delegation is never fully defined at their inception. Power therefore lies in the allocation and reallocation of prerogatives amongst branches of government under the active scrutiny of constitutional courts.