Fiche du document
2010
- handle: 10670/1.sv6x8i
- halshs: halshs-00550455
- doi: 10.1080/00036840701604495
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/00036840701604495
Mots-clés
Pharmaceutical Markets Price CompetitionSujets proches
Public markets Competition (Economics) Economic competition Competitiveness (Economics)Citer ce document
Laurent Granier et al., « Entry Deterrence and Mergers under Price Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1080/00036840701604495
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Résumé
After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.