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Date
2010
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- handle: 10670/1.t5796b
- halshs: halshs-00545212
- doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.016
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.016
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Employment protection layoff taxes minimum wage equilibrium unemployment market efficiency H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H21 - Efficiency • Optimal Taxation J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs/J.J3.J38 - Public Policy J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job SearchSujets proches
Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy TaxesCiter ce document
Frédéric Gavrel et al., « Layoff taxes and minimum wage: Two complementary public policies », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.016
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Résumé
In a matching model in which the job destruction rate and the output are endogenous, we show that the presence of a binding minimum wage prompts firms to choose too risky jobs. Introducing layoff taxes therefore reduces unemployment and improves market efficiency.