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2017
- handle: 10670/1.tvvnza
- hal: hal-01631180
- doi: 10.3917/redp.273.0375
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3917/redp.273.0375
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
strong Borda paradox impartial anonymous culture scoring rules Condorcet preference restrictions D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-MakingSujets proches
Cultural sociology Culture--Social aspects Sociology of cultureCiter ce document
Eric Kamwa et al., « Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.3917/redp.273.0375
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Résumé
For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In three-candidate elections, we use an analytical approach to find out, the range of all the scoring rules that can exhibit the Strong Borda Paradox under some well-known preference restrictions and we describe all the scenarios with respect to the rank of the Condorcet loser in the collective rankings. Using the parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm, we provide a simplified representation of the likelihood of the Strong Borda Paradox for the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule (given the size of the electorate) with the impartial and anonymous culture condition for each type of restriction.