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2020
- handle: 10670/1.tz1ts8
- hal: hal-02498354
- doi: 10.1561/105.00000119
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1561/105.00000119
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Embezzlement corruption donations transparency experiment C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O19 - International Linkages to Development • Role of International OrganizationsSujets proches
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Salvatore Di Falco et al., « Can shorter transfer chains and transparency reduce embezzlement? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1561/105.00000119
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Résumé
We study embezzlement when donations have to pass through intermediaries to reach recipients, by means of a sequential game tested in a laboratory experiment conducted in Tanzania. We investigate the impact on the amount embezzled of both the number of intermediaries in transfer chains and transparency about the donation. We show that donors are less generous in the presence of intermediaries. When transfer chains are shorter, aggregate embezzlement decreases, at least when donations are transparent. At the individual level, intermediaries embezzle less, the longer the transfer chain; this is due to less embezzlement at the beginning of the chain. We fail finding significant positive effects of transparency on the honesty of individual transfers through social judgment. JEL Codes: C91, D73, O19