The career-horizon problem in capital investments for lone-founder and long-tenure acquirer CEOs in their final career stage
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1 août 2019
- handle: 10670/1.u31v7c
- hal: hal-02312188
- doi: 10.1177/1476127018789594
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1177/1476127018789594
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Investments, Capital Fixed asset expenditures Capital spending Capital improvements Plant and equipment investments Plant investments Capital expendituresCiter ce document
Chittima Silberzahn et al., « The career-horizon problem in capital investments for lone-founder and long-tenure acquirer CEOs in their final career stage », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1177/1476127018789594
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Résumé
In this study, we apply organizational identification theory to enrich our knowledge of the career-horizon problem when CEOs are approaching retirement. The extant literature suggests that the closer a CEO is to retirement, the more likely she or he is to avoid long-term firm investments. Focusing on capital investments, we argue that the distinctive organizational identification with the firm of lone-founder CEOs and long-tenure acquirer CEOs can moderate the likelihood that the closer a CEO is to retirement, the more likely she or he is to avoid capital investments. We test and validate our hypotheses on a sample of CEOs in S&P 1500 non-financial firms between 1999 and 2010. This article contributes to the literature on CEO career horizons by providing a new and more fine-grained perspective on the important question of how different types of CEOs consider capital investments and the future of their firms as they approach retirement.