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2004
- handle: 10670/1.u9oruu
- 1665-2045
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Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época
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Tax complianceCiter ce document
Laura Sour, « An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity », Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época, ID : 10670/1.u9oruu
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Résumé
"Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed taxcompliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this modelboth moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explainfour pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditionalmodel, namely i) high level of tax compliance; ii) honest responses whenindividuals pay their taxes, even in the presence of high incentives fortax evasion; iii) the level of evasion increases with the tax rate; and iv)individuals are more likely to evade when they realize that there is alarge number of evaders in society."