The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government
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- handle: 10670/1.uvpmry
- hal: hal-01502442
- doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9
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Fortunes Riches Affluence Distribution of wealth Social science Sciences, Social Human sciences Social studies Behavioral sciences Desegregation Service of process Service of papers Abuse of process Process Political thought Government Political theory Civil government Commonwealth, The Science, Political Administration Politics Papers Funds Funding Copyright--Law and legislation Literary property Property, Literary Structures Edifices Halls Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Rongili Biswas et al., « The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9
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Résumé
This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-type process of jurisdiction formation by freely mobile households in the presence of a central government which makes equalization transfers across jurisdictions so as to maximize a generalized utilitarian or a max–min objective. It is shown that the introduction of such a central government significantly affects the set of stable jurisdiction structures. It is also shown that the class of households additively separable preferences that guarantees the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is unaffected by the presence of a central government if this government uses a generalized utilitarian objective. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013