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Litigation Attorneys Solicitors Bar Jurists Advocates Lawyers--Legal status, laws, etc Legal profession Barristers Actions and defenses--Law and legislation Interpleader Litigation Personal actions Lawsuits Defense (Law) Suits (Law) Real actions Civil actionsCiter ce document
B. Massenot, « Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development », Serveur académique Lausannois, ID : 10670/1.v8k0oc
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This paper introduces a model of litigation in a growth framework. Investors use litigation to enforce their financial contracts with entrepreneurs. A contest ensues in which both agents hire lawyers to increase their probability of winning the trial. The issue and the cost of the contest determine how much investors are willing to lend. More lawyers are hired when judicial efficiency is lower and damages are higher. Higher judicial efficiency and tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers benefit the economy, while the impact of higher damages is ambiguous. Some empirical evidence is also presented.