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- handle: 10670/1.vnwrxg
- halshs: halshs-01215998
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info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/295298/EU/Dynamic Structural Economic Models: Identification and Estimation/DYSMOIA
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism School Choice Stable Matching Student Preferences Admission Criteria College Admissions C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D50 - General D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D61 - Allocative Efficiency • Cost–Benefit Analysis I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I2 - Education and Research Institutions/I.I2.I21 - Analysis of EducationSujets proches
School, Choice of Schools--Selection Choice of school Parents' choice of school Students--Education Children--Education Education of children Schooling Pedagogy Youth--Education Instruction Education, Primitive Human resource developmentCiter ce document
Yinghua He et al., « Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.vnwrxg
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Résumé
We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex-ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.