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18 novembre 2019
- handle: 10670/1.vqi9tw
- halshs: halshs-02368016
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Gift-exchange incentives self-serving biases reference-dependent utility laboratory experiments labor conflicts C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D23 - Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M54 - Labor ManagementSujets proches
Labor and laboring classes Personnel Workers LaborersCiter ce document
Hernán Bejarano et al., « Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange and Reference Wages: Your Gift Need Not Be Mine! », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.vqi9tw
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Résumé
We extend Akerlof's (1982) gift-exchange model to the case in which reference wages respond to changes in the work environment such as those related to unemployment benefits or workers' productivity levels. Our model shows that these changes spur disagreements between workers and employers regarding the value of the reference wage. These disagreements tend to weaken the gift-exchange relationship thus reducing production levels and wages. We find support for these predictions in a controlled, yet realistic, workplace environment. Our work also sheds light on several stylized facts regarding employment relationships such as the increased intensity of labor conflicts when economic conditions are unstable.