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23 mai 2015
- handle: 10670/1.vrmjuj
- hal: hal-01208201
- doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.05.034
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.05.034
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OR in environment and climate change Carbon capture and storage CO2pipeline Club theory Regulation -fin]Sujets proches
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Olivier Massol et al., « Joining the CCS Club ! The economics of CO2 pipeline projects. », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.05.034
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Résumé
This paper examines the conditions for a widespread adoption of Carbon Capture transport and Storage (CCS) by a group of emitters that can be connected to a common CO2 pipeline. It details a modeling framework aimed at assessing the critical value in the charge for the CO2 emissions required for each of the emitters to decide to implement capture capabilities. This model can be used to analyze how the tariff structure imposed on the CO2 pipeline operator modifies the overall cost of CO2 abatement via CCS. This framework is applied to the case of a real European CO2 pipeline project. We find that the obligation to use cross-subsidy-free pipeline tariffs has a minor impact on the minimum CO2 price required to adopt the CCS. In contrast, the obligation to charge non-discriminatory prices can either impede the adoption of CCS or significantly raise that price. Besides which, we compared two alternative regulatory frameworks for CO2 pipelines: a common European organization as opposed to a collection of national regulations. The results indicate that the institutional scope of that regulation has a limited impact on the adoption of CCS compared to the detailed design of the tariff structure imposed on pipeline operators.