Fiche du document
2005
- handle: 10670/1.vu77l8
- ijn_00000573
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Sujets proches
Social cognition Interpersonal perception Cognition, SocialCiter ce document
Pierre Jacob et al., « The motor theory of social cognition: a critique », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10670/1.vu77l8
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of mirror neurons first discovered in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys seems to provide an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospect of a motor theory of human social cognition. In humans, however, social cognition encompasses the ability to mindread. Many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we argue that motor simulation is neither sufficient nor necessary for third-person mindreading.