Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
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2020
- handle: 10670/1.w076zf
- hal: hal-02531404
- doi: 10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z
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Francesca Busetto et al., « Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z
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Résumé
We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467-501, 1973), that a Cournot-Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.