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- handle: 10670/1.w1cqbw
- hal: hal-02021221
- doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.011
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.011
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Mots-clés
Best-response dynamics Public good games Stability C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods -fin]Sujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's gamesCiter ce document
Sebastian Bervoets et al., « Stability in games with continua of equilibria », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.011
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The stability of Nash equilibria has often been studied by examining the asymptotic behavior of the best-response dynamics. This is generally done in games where interactions are global and equilibria are isolated. In this paper, we analyze stability in contexts where interactions are local and where there are continua of equilibria. We focus on the public good game played on a network, where the set of equilibria is known to depend on the network structure (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007), and where, as we show, continua of equilibria often appear. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a component of Nash equilibria to be asymptotically stable vis-à-vis the best-response dynamics. Interestingly, we demonstrate that these conditions relate to the structure of the network in a simple way. We also provide corresponding results for several dynamical systems related to the best response.