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1 mai 2011
- handle: 10670/1.wfq60g
- hal: hal-03473798
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/5um2bhne3f862raaulvoogm15e
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/5um2bhne3f862raaulvoogm15e
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
resource curse expropriation transparency investment efficiency growth G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G15 - International Financial Markets G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G18 - Government Policy and Regulation G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G38 - Government Policy and Regulation K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity/O.O4.O43 - Institutions and GrowthSujets proches
Transparence Condemnation of land Land, Condemnation of Compulsory purchase (Eminent domain) Takings (Eminent domain) Domain, Eminent Expropriation Eminent domain--Law and legislationCiter ce document
Art Durnev et al., « Resource Curse: A Corporate Transparency Channel », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10670/1.wfq60g
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Résumé
We propose a new channel through which expropriation risk reduces capital allocation efficiency and decreases firm growth. We build an agency model of corporate disclosure when companies face risks of expropriation. The model predicts that in countries with insecure property rights, corporations mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing transparency. We test this channel by employing a difference-in-difference approach. Using a panel of over 16,000 firms from 84 countries, we find that transparency of companies prone to expropriation is lower in countries with insecure property rights. The reduced transparency has an adverse effect on the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate growth.