Marketing contract choices in agriculture: The role of price expectation and price risk management

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/agec.12675

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Arnaud Reynaud et al., « Marketing contract choices in agriculture: The role of price expectation and price risk management », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/agec.12675


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We identify factors involved in the decision of farmers to use marketing contracts (pool, storage and forward contracts), and we explicitly account for the hedging and price-enhancement components of this decision. Using panel corner solution models (Tobit and double-hurdle) to represent farmers' contracting decision using a sample of French cereal producers, we find that both the hedging and the price-enhancement motives are important factors driving marketing choices. When risk aversion or exposure to price risk rises, the price-enhancement motive becomes less influential. Farmers appear to be more reluctant to base their marketing decisions on their price expectations in that case.

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