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2017
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- handle: 10670/1.wiaeih
- hal: hal-01952992
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Quality Collective Reputation Incentives D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D47 - Market Design D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L15 - Information and Product Quality • Standardization and CompatibilitySujets proches
Industrial economics Market structureCiter ce document
Pierre Fleckinger et al., « The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.wiaeih
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We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.