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1 avril 2012
- handle: 10670/1.wortk8
- hal: hal-03461247
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9k0sk04p9n
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9k0sk04p9n
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Renewable Energy Policy Political Economy Product Market Regulation Lobbying Policy Indicators Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q4 - Energy/Q.Q4.Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q4 - Energy/Q.Q4.Q48 - Government Policy D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O38 - Government PolicySujets proches
Economic theory Political economyCiter ce document
Francesco Nicolli et al., « The evolution of renewable energy policy in OECD countries: aggregate indicators and determinants », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10670/1.wortk8
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Résumé
This paper proposes different methods to aggregate heterogeneous policies for renewable energy. Wecompare time-varying indicators built using principal component analysis with average-based indicators. The main goal of the paper is to account for the evolution of both types of policy indicators with a set of common variables. Our empirical results are consistent with predictions of politicaleconomy models of environmental policies as lobbying, income and, to a less extent, inequality have expected effects on policy. The brown lobbying power, proxied by entry barriers in the energy sector, has negative influence on the policy indicators even when taking into account endogeneity in its effect. The results are also robust to dynamic panel specifications and to the exclusion of groups of countries. Interestingly, too, corruption has only an indirect effect on policy mediated by entry barriers, while the negative effect of inequality is much stronger for the richer countries.