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Pavlos Lefas, « Declarative and Tacit Knowledge in Vitruvius: Disciplina, fabrica and ratiocinatio in De architectura I, 1 », Repository of Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University in Belgrade, ID : 10.5281/zenodo.7905108
In the opening chapter of De architectura Vitruvius ex-amines the knowledge required to practice architecture and the means to acquire it. These, he claims, are manual skills and rational thought on one hand, deductive reasoning on the other. While the former suf-fice to make sound buildings, the latter is needed to integrate the build-ing-to-be in the world order. A scheme emerges: the knowledge required is both procedural and declarative. Vitruvius’ approach was uncommon, because it put these two kinds of knowledge on the same footing. By as-sociating manual skill with rational thought, and claiming that it creates new knowledge, as does deductive reasoning, Vitruvius places himself on the side of modern scholarship, rather, than on that of his contemporary philosophy, as much as he depended on it.