Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation

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1 décembre 2015

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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess




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Andrés Cendales et al., « Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation », Estudios Económicos (México, D.F.), ID : 10670/1.wtnwor


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This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government.

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