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1 août 2013
- handle: 10670/1.wwo7o2
- hal: hal-00852356
- doi: 10.1111/jofi.12042
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/jofi.12042
Mots-clés
Financial shocks Information asymmetry Real effects Investment Financing Cash holdings Natural experiment Matching estimators Difference-in- differences Equity research analysts D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D80 - General G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G24 - Investment Banking • Venture Capital • Brokerage • Ratings and Ratings Agencies G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G31 - Capital Budgeting • Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies • Capacity G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G34 - Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate Governance G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G35 - Payout PolicySujets proches
Capitalization (Finance) Managerial finance Corporate financial management Financial management of corporations Financial management, Corporate Corporate finance Corporation finance Financial analysis of corporations Business finance Financial planning of corporations Businesses Firms Companies Enterprises Business organizations Organizations, BusinessCiter ce document
François Derrien et al., « The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10.1111/jofi.12042
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Résumé
We study the causal effects of analyst coverage on corporate investment and financing policies. We hypothesize that a decrease in analyst coverage increases information asymmetry and thus increases the cost of capital; as a result, firms decrease their investment and financing. We use broker closures and broker mergers to identify changes in analyst coverage that are exogenous to corporate policies. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that firms that lose an analyst decrease their investment and financing by 1.9% and 2.0% of total assets, respectively, compared to similar firms that do not lose an analyst.