Separating isotope facts from fallacies: nuclear weapons proliferation in the eyes of three intelligence communities
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16 avril 2022
- handle: 10670/1.xc3ki2
- hal: hal-04106825
- doi: 10.1080/02684527.2021.1992153
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/02684527.2021.1992153
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Alexander K. Bollfrass, « Separating isotope facts from fallacies: nuclear weapons proliferation in the eyes of three intelligence communities », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1080/02684527.2021.1992153
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Résumé
Separating Isotope Facts from Fallacies compares how intelligence agencies have performed in assessing the nuclear proliferation intentions of other countries. Using original archival and declassified documents from the Cold War era, the study appraises the accuracy of American, British, and West German intelligence proliferation assessments of India and Argentina. Contrary to pervasive scepticism, the available historical documentation shows that intelligence agencies did not habitually inflate their assessments of proliferation risks unless they anticipated arms race dynamics. Second, target state attitudes toward the nonproliferation regime provide essential clues to their nuclear intent. Third, more information about intentions did not inherently improve accuracy.