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- handle: 10670/1.xdhjwx
- hal: hal-03800580
- doi: 10.1257/aer.20171927
- WOS: 000749313400009
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.20171927
Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and SubsidiesSujets proches
Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy TaxesCiter ce document
Felix Bierbrauer et al., « Taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10.1257/aer.20171927
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Résumé
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout andendogenous platforms. Parties trade o incentivizing their supporters to voteand discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We showthat the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge inthe political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead tothe adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi-lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributivetaxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voterswho are demobilized.