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12 mars 2024
- handle: 10670/1.ximl9x
- hal: hal-03099678
- doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
network Cheap talk direct mediated communication protocol C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
Communication, Primitive Mass communicationCiter ce document
Marie Laclau et al., « Communication on networks and strong reliability », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822
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Résumé
We consider sender--receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes not only of the direct communication game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate directly with each other) but also of the mediated game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate with the help of a mediator).