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2023
- handle: 10670/1.xn9vnf
- hal: hal-04310265
- doi: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7
Mots-clés
Front running Game theory MEV Transactions reordering commit-reveal Computer systems organization → Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networksSujets proches
Computing systems ADP systems (Computer systems) Worth Axiology Natural science Sciences Science of science Organisation Games, Theory of Theory of games Funds Funding Competition (Economics) Economic competition Competitiveness (Economics) Pickling Preserving Finance, commerce, confiscations, etc Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examinationCiter ce document
Andrea Canidio et al., « Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract) », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7
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Résumé
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks ("bad MEV") while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most ("good MEV").