A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
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2017
- handle: 10670/1.y31ruz
- halshs: halshs-01381379
- doi: 10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5
Mots-clés
Bidding approach ‘Take-it-or-leave-it’ procedure Implementation Rooted tree TU-games Sequential equal surplus division C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching TheorySujets proches
Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Bargaining Labor negotiationsCiter ce document
Sylvain Béal et al., « A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5
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Résumé
We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al. in Theory Decis 79:251–283, 2015). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rooted tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them. Our proofs rely on interesting properties that we provide for a general class of bidding mechanisms.