Workplace Democracy, the Bicameral Firm, and Stakeholder Theory

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Marc Fleurbaey, « Workplace Democracy, the Bicameral Firm, and Stakeholder Theory », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1177/00323292231163700


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Ferreras's bicameral governance proposal for the corporation contributes to a recent wave of interest in democratizing the workplace. In this article, I connect this to a related ongoing movement in favor of the stakeholder approach to corporate purpose. I argue that this connection sheds light on, and may provide remedies for, some issues with the bicameral proposal: first, the risk of gridlock between the two parties in the dual governance structure; second, the indeterminacy of good management when shareholder primacy is abandoned. But I also note that shareholder primacy emerged spontaneously from structural features of the economy, so that special protection for the “good” firms is warranted, and that other key limitations of a market economy cannot be alleviated fully by democratizing the firm.

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