Fiche du document
2023
- handle: 10670/1.yd78gy
- hal: hal-04193948
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
soft commitment hard commitment risk taking self-control JEL Codes: C93 D02 D91 C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and SavingSujets proches
Coats of arms Devices Arms, Coats of Heraldic devices Expenses Costs (Economics)Citer ce document
Paul Bettega et al., « Hard vs. soft commitments: Experimental evidence from a sample of French gamblers * », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.yd78gy
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Résumé
People use commitment devices to formalize and facilitate their goals. Self-commitments are ubiquitous and may take different forms: soft, when the commitment can be broken at a low cost, or hard, when that cost is high. The effects of soft and hard commitments have usually been studied separately. We conduct an online experiment with 1527 individuals representative of a big gambling company's client population to study the comparative effects of hard and soft commitment devices in a risk taking game. Our results show that asking for a hard limit leads subjects to reduce their risk-taking even when the limit turns out to be non-binding, i.e., the commitment is ex-post soft. Hard commitments lead to slightly lower levels of risk taking.