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- handle: 10670/1.yjcp2a
- halshs: halshs-01109527
- doi: 10.1016/j.jup.2014.09.002
- PRODINRA: 368441
- WOS: 000347578200025
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jup.2014.09.002
Mots-clés
Water sector Electricity sector Africa Incentive regulation L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of Regulation L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L94 - Electric Utilities L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L95 - Gas Utilities • Pipelines • Water Utilities O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O5 - Economywide Country Studies/O.O5.O55 - AfricaCiter ce document
Liam Wren-Lewis, « Utility regulation in Africa: How relevant is the British model? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jup.2014.09.002
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Résumé
This article considers whether African utility regulators can draw useful lessons from the British experience over the past thirty years. We focus on three features that are considered key properties of the British regulatory model: price-cap incentive regulation, independent regulatory agencies and an emphasis on introducing competition where possible. For each property, we ask how relevant the model is for most African countries. Overall, we argue that although the British model probably has some lessons which can help improve utility performance in Africa, the problems that they help to solve are generally second-order. Ultimately, institutional weaknesses are the main root of regulatory failure in many African countries, and these weaknesses call for a model of regulation designed specifically to address them.