Contrats verticaux avec plusieurs firmes en aval et un fournisseur alternatif, discrimination et non-discrimination en prix
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2006
- handle: 10670/1.ys8mb0
- hal: hal-02662387
- doi: 10.1007/s11151-006-0008-6
- PRODINRA: 14663
- WOS: 000235576100005
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11151-006-0008-6
Mots-clés
THEORIE DES CONTRATS OLIGOPOLE ANALYSE DISCRIMINANTE BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY VERTICAL CONTRACTING BARGAINING EFFECT RELATION INDUSTRIE DISTRIBUTION PRICE DISCRIMINATIONSujets proches
Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Bargaining Labor negotiationsCiter ce document
Stéphane Caprice, « Contrats verticaux avec plusieurs firmes en aval et un fournisseur alternatif, discrimination et non-discrimination en prix », HAL-SHS : sociologie, ID : 10.1007/s11151-006-0008-6
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Résumé
Rey and Tirole [Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier (2005)] considered a model in which a monopolist sells to downstream firms using nonlinear contracts. They showed that banning price discrimination fully restores the supplier’s ability to leverage its monopoly power by enabling it to commit not to offer side discounts. I show that the situation changes when the supplier competes against a fringe of less efficient rivals rather than being a monopolist. Then banning price discrimination may cause per-unit prices to fall and welfare to increase. The dominant supplier can take advantage of a strategic bargaining effect: reducing the per-unit price makes the outside option of buying from the fringe less profitable, allowing the dominant supplier to extract more bargaining surplus through the fixed fee.