Fiche du document
2019
- handle: 10670/1.z3owek
- halshs: halshs-02283118
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Tax competition Urban economics Traffic congestion Public goods Mobility H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R5 - Regional Government Analysis/R.R5.R50 - General R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R5 - Regional Government Analysis/R.R5.R51 - Finance in Urban and Rural EconomiesSujets proches
Traffic jams Congested traffic Jams, Traffic Gridlock (Traffic flow) Reduction of traffic congestion Congestion, Traffic Goods, Public Global cities Towns Urban systems Municipalities Urban areas Capital assets Fixed assetsCiter ce document
Tidiane Ly, « Taxes, traffic jam and spillover in the metropolis », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.z3owek
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Résumé
This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.