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- handle: 10670/1.zm89m6
- halshs: halshs-01301784
- doi: 10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5
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Mots-clés
Dichotomous Choice Mechanism Preference revelation Oath Hypothetical bias C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental EconomicsSujets proches
Referenda Referendums Ballot initiatives Initiatives, Ballot Ballot measures Initiative and referendum Propositions (Referendum) BiasCiter ce document
Nicolas Jacquemet et al., « Referenda Under Oath », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5
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Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.