Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers

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Date

23 octobre 2018

Type de document
Périmètre
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arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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Ralph-Christopher Bayer et al., « Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers », arXiv - économie, ID : 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.002


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Using the Panama Papers, we show that the beginning of media reporting on expropriations and property confiscations in a country increases the probability that offshore entities are incorporated by agents from the same country in the same month. This result is robust to the use of country-year fixed effects and the exclusion of tax havens. Further analysis shows that the effect is driven by countries with non-corrupt and effective governments, which supports the notion that offshore entities are incorporated when reasonably well-intended and well-functioning governments become more serious about fighting organized crime by confiscating proceeds of crime.

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