The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large

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Auteur

Josué Ortega

Date

24 octobre 2018

Discipline

Economies et finances

Type de document

Textes imprimés

Périmètre

Publications

Identifiants

1810.10287
Economics Letters, Volume 174, January 2019, Pages 48-51
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028

Source

arXiv - économie

Collection

Organisation

Cornell University

Mots-clés 0

Economics - Theoretical Economics

Sujets proches En

Public markets Economic theory Political economy

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Josué Ortega, « The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large », arXiv - économie, ID : 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028

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Résumé 0

Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

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