Fiche du document
7 novembre 2021
- 2111.04172
- RAND Journal of Economics, 2023
- doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12440
Mots-clés
Economics - General EconomicsSujets proches
Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy)Citer ce document
Aditya Kuvalekar et al., « The Wrong Kind of Information », arXiv - économie, ID : 10.1111/1756-2171.12440
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
Agents, some with a bias, decide between undertaking a risky project and a safe alternative based on information about the project's efficiency. Only a part of that information is verifiable. Unbiased agents want to undertake only efficient projects, while biased agents want to undertake any project. If the project causes harm, a court examines the verifiable information, forms a belief about the agent's type, and decides the punishment. Tension arises between deterring inefficient projects and a chilling effect on using the unverifiable information. Improving the unverifiable information always increases overall efficiency, but improving the verifiable information may reduce efficiency.