Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions

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Auteurs

Date

29 mai 2022

Discipline

Economies et finances

Type de document

Textes imprimés

Périmètre

Publications

Identifiants

2205.14758
ITCS 2022: 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66

Source

arXiv - économie

Collection

Organisation

Cornell University

Mots-clés Und

Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Economics - Econometrics

Sujets proches En Fr

informatisation

Citer ce document

Meryem Essaidi et al., « Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions », arXiv - économie, ID : 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66

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