Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective

Metadatas

type
Language
Identifiers
Relations

This document is linked to :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.05.003

Collection

Archives ouvertes

License

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess



Similar subjects Fr

nucléus

Cite this document

Stéphane Gonzalez et al., « Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.05.003


Metrics


Share / Export

Abstract En

The article explores the implications of natural resource scarcity in terms of global cooperation and trade. We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term agreements that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and productive capacity, while caring about future generations. For that purpose, we build an original cooperative game framework, where countries can form coalitions in order to optimize their discounted consumption stream in the long-run, within the limits of their stock of natural resources. We use the concept of the strong sequential core that satisfies both coalitional stability and time consistency. We show that this set is nonempty, stating that an international long-term agreement along the optimal path will be self-enforcing. The presented model sets out a conceptual framework for exploring the fair sharing of the fruits of global economic growth.

document thumbnail

From the same authors

On the same subjects

Within the same disciplines

Export in