Independent Regulatory Agencies and Political-Administrative Relations in Contemporary European Democracies:Some Tentative Reflections Nepriklausomos reguliavimo agentūros bei politiniai ir administraciniai santykiai šiuolaikinėse Europos demokratinėse valstybėse: keletas hipotetinių įžvalgų
Fiche du document
31 décembre 2021
- handle: 10670/1.u8vjpw
- hal: hal-03703075
- doi: 10.51740/ps.vi31.775
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.51740/ps.vi31.775
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
parliamentary democracy independent regulatory agencies principal-Agent depoliticization interest-groups regulation Parlamento studijos / Parliamentary StudiesSujets proches
Independent administrative agencies Commissions of the federal government Independent agencies Regulatory commissions Quasi-judicial agencies Regulatory agencies Commissions, Independent regulatory Executive agencies Agencies, Administrative Administrative agencies--Law and legislation Government agencies Regulatory agencies Relations--Foreign countries Relations (Canon law)Citer ce document
Cyril Benoît, « Independent Regulatory Agencies and Political-Administrative Relations in Contemporary European Democracies:Some Tentative Reflections », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.51740/ps.vi31.775
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
This essay provides a concise overview of the current state of political-administrative relations in Europe's Parliamentary democracy. It is more particularly focused on presenting the implications that the growth of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) has had on such relationship, and on reviewing the empirical evidence in support of three distinct scenarios-one in which politicians abdicate their control power over IRAs to the benefit of interest groups; one where IRAs maintain and expand their autonomy or de facto independence both vis-à-vis politicians and interest-groups; and one where politicians regain control over IRAs and their decisions. I argue that even if the second scenario has received extended empirical support, politicization under the regulatory order could well be underestimated with broader implications for political-administrative relations that are briefly introduced.