World knowledge induces false memories in problem-recall tasks: New evidence for the SECO model

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9 février 2024

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Hippolyte Gros et al., « World knowledge induces false memories in problem-recall tasks: New evidence for the SECO model », HAL-SHS : sciences de l'éducation, ID : 10.31234/osf.io/4dq2e


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Is there a fundamental difference between counting years and kilograms? Marbles and centimeters? Floors and euros? Recent evidence suggests that non-mathematical world knowledge irrelated to the mathematical structure of a problem can nevertheless influence its semantic encoding. To tackle this question, we created arithmetic word problems devised to promote contrasting encodings by featuring different quantities, in French and in English. We designed three experiments investigating the representations constructed and memorized by 302 adult participants when solving the problems. After an initial solving task, participants were given an unexpected task: either recall the problems (Experiments 1 and 2) or identify experimenter-induced changes in target problem sentences (Experiment 3). We predicted that the use of specific quantities in the problem statements was enough to lead participants to erroneously recall mathematical information that was not present in the problems, but that could be inferred from one of the two possible encodings of the situations. Results across all three experiments consistently indicate that participants construct and memorize a different problem encoding depending on the quantities involved. They misremembered problems involving durations, heights, or elevators by including new information into their problem representation. The same recall mistakes were not made for problems involving prices, weights or collections. This supports the claim that knowledge related to daily-life quantities substantially influences arithmetic reasoning, despite such knowledge being irrelevant for abstract reasoning.

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